Malaria Treatment Policy Change and Implementation: The Case of Uganda by Nanyunja, Miriam et al.
SAGE-Hindawi Access to Research
Malaria Research and Treatment
Volume 2011, Article ID 683167, 14 pages
doi:10.4061/2011/683167
Review Article
Malaria Treatment Policy Change and Implementation:
TheCase of Uganda
Miriam Nanyunja,1 Juliet Nabyonga Orem,2 Frederick Kato,3 MugaggaKaggwa,1
CharlesKatureebe,1 andJoaquimSaweka4
1Disease Prevention and Control Cluster: World Health Organization, Uganda Country Oﬃce, P.O. Box 24578, Kampala, Uganda
2Health Systems and Services Cluster: World Health Organization, Uganda Country Oﬃce, P.O. Box 24578, Kampala, Uganda
3National Malaria Control Program: Ministry of Health P.O. Box 7272, Kampala, Uganda
4World Health Organization, Uganda Country Oﬃce, P.O. Box 24578, Kampala, Uganda
Correspondence should be addressed to Juliet Nabyonga Orem, nabyongaj@ug.afro.who.int
Received 17 March 2011; Accepted 7 July 2011
Academic Editor: Ananias Escalante
Copyright © 2011 Miriam Nanyunja et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
cited.
Malaria due to P. falciparum is the number one cause of morbidity and mortality in Uganda where it is highly endemic in 95%
of the country. The use of eﬃcacious and eﬀective antimalarial medicines is one of the key strategies for malaria control. Until
2000, Chloroquine (CQ) was the ﬁrst-line drug for treatment of uncomplicated malaria in Uganda. Due to progressive resistance
to CQ and to a combination of CQ with Sulfadoxine-Pyrimethamine, Uganda in 2004 adopted the use of ACTs as ﬁrst-line drug
for treating uncomplicated malaria. A review of the drug policy change process and postimplementation reports highlight the
importance of managing the policy change process, generating evidence for policy decisions and availability of adequate and
predictable funding for eﬀective policy roll-out. These and other lessons learnt can be used to guide countries that are considering
anti-malarial drug change in future.
1.Introduction
Malaria is the number one cause of morbidity and mortality
in Uganda. It is highly endemic in 95% of the country,
and the remaining 5% of the country is prone to malaria
epidemics [1]. Over 95% of the malaria cases are due to
plasmodium falciparum.E ﬀective malaria case management,
using eﬃcacious and eﬀective antimalarial medicines, is
one of the recommended strategies for malaria control [2].
Until 2000, Chloroquine (CQ) was the ﬁrst-line medicine
for treatment of uncomplicated malaria in Uganda, and
Sulfadoxine/Pyrimethamine (SP) or Amodiaquine (AQ) was
the 2nd-line medicine while Quinine (Qn) was the reserve
medicine. For severe malaria, Qn was the recommended
medicine initially given intravenously until the patient is
conscious and able to take medicines orally [3]. However,
in the late 1990s, parasite resistance to CQ, at varying levels
in the 8 East African Network for Monitoring Antimalarial
Treatment(EANMAT)sentinelsiteslocatedindiﬀerentparts
of the country, was documented. By 2000, the parasitological
resistance to CQ had increased signiﬁcantly, ranging from
<5% to >50% in diﬀerent sites, and clinical failure following
CQ treatment in Uganda had increased to about 38% [4],
exceeding the WHO recommended threshold of clinical fail-
ure of 25%, beyond which policy change is recommended in
theshortesttimepossible[5].Ugandaembarkedonamalaria
treatment policy change process as shown in Figure 1.A f t e r
several technical discussions and considerations, the ﬁrst-
line antimalarial medicine for uncomplicated malaria was
changedfromCQonly,andanewinterimpolicywithacom-
bination of CQ and Sulfadoxine-Pyrimethamine (CQ/SP)
as ﬁrst-line treatment was adopted. The selection of CQ/SP
was based on assumption that the combination would be
more eﬃcacious than CQ monotherapy [5]. In addition,
the government could ensure availability of the CQ/SP
combination to all public health facilities using available
resources. However, between 2001 and 2004, the eﬃcacy of
CQ/SP reduced signiﬁcantly, with treatment failure ranging2 Malaria Research and Treatment
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Figure 1: A timeline of key events during the malaria drug policy change in Uganda.
from 22% to 77% (median 41%) [6–9]. In line with the
WHO recommended threshold for antimalarial drug policy
change (clinical failure rate of ≥25%), Uganda embarked on
yet another policy change process that culminated in the
adoption of artimesinin combination therapies (ACTs) as
the ﬁrst-line treatment for uncomplicated malaria. Quinine
was selected as the second-line treatment for uncomplicated
malaria and ﬁrst-line treatment for severe malaria and for
malaria in pregnancy. Speciﬁcally, Artemether-Lumefantrine
(AL) was adopted as the ﬁrst-line treatment for uncom-
plicated malaria, with Artesunate-Amodiaquine (AS/AQ) as
an alternative ﬁrst-line [10]. This paper describes this last
policy change process, factors put into consideration prior
to adoption of this policy, the roll-out of the policy, 5-yearMalaria Research and Treatment 3
experience of implementation of the new policy, and the
lessons learnt, to guide other countries that consider malaria
treatment policy change.
2. Methods
We reviewed unpublished reports and scientiﬁc publications
on several drug eﬃcacy studies conducted in Uganda
between 2000 and 2004 to document the evidence used in
selection of the ﬁrst-line antimalarial drug. We also reviewed
unpublished reports and minutes of several meetings that
were held to gain consensus on the medicine to adopt as
ﬁrst-linefortreatmentofuncomplicatedmalaria,thereports
of the task force that was constituted to guide the implemen-
tation of the new policy and its subcommittees, the minutes
of the diﬀerent meetings held by the subcommittees and
the task force, as well as the documentation of the malaria
treatment policy change process that summarized the whole
process step by step and included some of the key reports as
attachments. For experiences on the implementation of the
policy, and challenges faced, we reviewed several reports and
publications by diﬀerent groups of people that conducted
studies to assess the level of implementation of the new
policy. The studies were done at diﬀerent periods after the
introduction of the policy. We also used information from
National Medical Stores (NMS) and National Malaria
Control Programme (NMCP) reports, the Malaria Indicator
Survey report, and Annual Health Sector Reports for the
details on policy implementation and drug availability.
However, and most important, the ﬁrst and third authors
participated in the whole policy change process, compiled
the documentation of the drug policy change process, and
thus also input personal experiences into the paper.
2.1. Malaria Treatment Policy Change Process
2.1.1. Decision-Making Process. In 2004, results of malaria
drug eﬃcacy studies in Uganda showing high and wide-
spread resistance to CQ/SP (Table 1) caught the Ministry
of Health (MoH) by surprise as it had not been adequately
updated on the growing resistance by the researchers. This
happened around the same time that WHO released the
WHO statement on ACTs as the most eﬀective antimalarials
that should be considered as ﬁrst-line treatment for malaria
in highly endemic countries with CQ resistance [11]. At the
same time there was international pressure and advocacy
from malaria experts about the need to change malaria treat-
ment policy to ACTs as ﬁrst-line treatment in several coun-
tries including Uganda [12]. Several technical meetings were
held by partners including WHO, Malaria Consortium, and
the researchers with MoH, until the need to change malaria
treatment policy was appreciated, accepted, and commis-
sioned by the MoH. Policy change discussions were then
initiated, with support from WHO and other partners.
Whereas in principle policy change to ACTs was
inevitable, the cost of ACTs was prohibitive and unaﬀord-
able by the Government of Uganda. However, there were
prospects of funding for ACTs by the Global Fund for AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM). Uganda responded to
a call for round 4 proposals by the GFATM and submitted
a 5-year grant proposal to support the procurement and
introduction of ACTs for malaria treatment in Uganda. The
success of the round 4 GFATM proposal and hence assurance
of funds for ACTs for 5 years paved way for discussions to
consider adoption of ACTs in Uganda.
A one-day technical meeting was jointly convened
by WHO and MoH to review the evidence available and
make a decision on which ACT to adopt. The meeting was
attended by technical experts in malaria case management
in Uganda, Malaria researchers from Makerere University
and University of California, San Francisco collaboration,
technical advisors from WHO headquarters, Regional Oﬃce
for Africa, and Country oﬃce, Malaria consortium, USAID,
DFID, and MSF. Results of the various studies on eﬃcacy of
CQ/SP, other non-ACT medicines, and ACTs (Table 1)a n d
one study on eﬀectiveness of Artemether-Lumefantrine (AL)
[13] were presented and discussed. WHO technical experts
also made a presentation on WHO guidance and its basis
as well as the recommended ACTs [11]. Discussions held
on which ACTs to adopt covered eﬃcacy and eﬀectiveness,
drug formulation with a preference for coformulated tablets
to copackaged ones, availability of a pediatric formulation,
ease of administration, possible adverse eﬀects, cost, and
ease of use by both qualiﬁed health workers and community
health workers during home-based management of fever
(Table 2). Though ACTs were expensive, with Artemether/
Lumefantrine (AL) being more expensive than Amodiaquine
and Artesunate (AQ/AS), it was anticipated that, in the
f u t u r e ,p r i c e sw o u l dc o m ed o w nd u et oe c o n o m i e so f
scale. Besides, funding had already been secured from the
GFATM for procuring adequate quantities of ACTs for the
foreseeable future. Discussions were tough, with diﬀerent
groups having diﬀerent ACT preferences due to personal and
possible external inﬂuences, but consensus was achieved;
AL was selected as the ﬁrst-line antimalarial. After further
review by the MoH technical team, AQ/AS was selected as
an alternative ﬁrst-line drug (Table 2). Agreement on what
drug to adopt for home-based management of fever was
harder, and consensus was not achieved at this meeting, with
some experts suggesting a combination of Amodiaquine and
SP (AQ/SP) that was still fairly eﬃcacious instead of taking
ACTs to community level. The Director General of Health
Services convened another technical meeting to discuss this
further, and ﬁnally it was agreed that ﬁrst-line ACTs should
be accessed by all people with uncomplicated malaria at both
health facility and community level.
Parasite resistance to CQ/SP was above the WHO treat-
ment failure threshold in some regions and was reported to
bebelowthethresholdinotherregions.Thisraisedquestions
on whether the policy change should be applied to some
parts of the country and leave the others using CQ/SP until
the treatment failure rate reaches the threshold for drug
policy change. After review of the logistical challenges of
implementing a dual ﬁrst-line policy, it was agreed that the
policywouldbechangedforthewholecountry.Abriefabout
the proposed change in malaria treatment policy was written
and presented to the MoH top management for approval by4 Malaria Research and Treatment
Table 1: Antimalarial drug eﬃcacy studies in Uganda from 2000 to 2001: results for children less than 5 years.
Period of
study
Site, transmission
intensity
Researchers/authors
and/or publication Protocol used Drug or drug
combination
Treatment failure rates (%) Parasitological
failure rate (%)
After 14 days After 28 days
2000 Kampala, Medium [14] WHO 1996
SP 10 — —
AQ 7 — —
AQ/SP 3 — —
July 2000 to
August 2001 Kampala, Medium [15]
Longitudinal
study
SP 17 — 32
AQ/SP 1 — 2
AS/SP 1 — 5
July to Sept
2001 Kaberamaido, high [16] WHO 1996
CQ — 45 —
SP — 16 —
CQ/SP — 12 —
October 2001 Kabale, low [17]∗ WHO 1996b
CQ 7.5 — —
SP 0 — —
CQ/SP 0 — —
March 2001
to Jan 2002 Kampala, Medium [18]∗ WHO 1996
SP — 15 30
CQ/SP — 7 17
AQ/SP — 0 1
Dec 2001 to
March 2002 Tororo, high [7] WHO 1996
CQ/SP 8 — 40
AQ/SP 0 — 15
SP 9 — 42
Jan to Nov
2002 Bundibugyo, high [19] WHO 2002
SP 23.4 37 —
AQ 8.8 20.6 —
CQ/SP 6.0 22.8 —
Aug 2002 to
July 2003
Mulago Hospital,
Kampala Medium [9] WHO 1996
CQ/SP — 35 —
AQ/SP — 9 —
AQ/AS — 2 —
Dec 2002 to
June 2003
Kanungu, low [8] WHO 1996 CQ/SP — 67 73
AQ/SP — 35 38
Kyenjojo, high [8] WHO 1996 CQ/SP — 37 58
AQ/SP — 14 24
Mubende, medium [8] WHO 1996 CQ/SP — 34 43
AQ/SP — 13 14
All sites combined [8] WHO 1996 CQ/SP 22 Range 34–67 Range 43–73
AQ/SP 8 Range 13–35 Range 14–38
Nov 2002 to
May 2004
Jinja, low to
medium [20] WHO 2003
CQ/SP — 40 —
AQ/SP — 13 —
AQ/AS — 4 —
Arua, medium to
high [20] WHO 2003
CQ/SP — 46 —
AQ/SP — 14 —
AQ/AS — 9 —
Tororo, high [20] WHO 2003
CQ/SP — 34 —
AQ/SP — 18 —
AQ/AS — 12 —
Apac, high [20] WHO 2003
CQ/SP — 22 —
AQ/SP — 7 —
AQ/AS — 10 —
All sites combined [20] WHO 2003 CQ/SP — 22–46 —
AQ/SP — 7–18 —
AQ/AS — 4–10
∗Study participants included both children and adults; results reported for both children and adults together. AS: Artesunate; AQ: Amodiaquine, CQ:
Chloroquine, SP: Sulfadoxine-Pyrimethamine.Malaria Research and Treatment 5
Table 2: How the decision to select the ﬁrst-line treatment was reached.
Combination Decision Comments
Artemether/Lumefantrine (3 days-course) Possible
Shown good eﬃcacy in Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and other
African countries; good eﬀectiveness in Uganda;
coformulated tablets, prepacked in treatment courses for
speciﬁc age groups
Artesunate (3 days) + Amodiaquine (3 days) Possible
Shown good eﬃcacy in Uganda; co-packaged; provider and
consumer acceptance of Amodiaquine was low hence
co-packaging instead of coformulation could encourage
administering Artesunate and leaving Amodiaquine, some
resistance to the combination already documented in Uganda
Artesunate (3 days) +
Sulfadoxine/Pyrimethamine (1 day) Rejected
There was already high resistance of P. falciparum to SP in
Uganda and in the sub-region; and already some resistance to
Artesunate—SP combination in Uganda
Amodiaquine (3 days) +
Sulfadoxine/Pyrimethamine (1 day) Rejected
According to WHO recommendations this combination
should be an interim policy recommended where ACTs
cannot be immediately deployed and where parasite
resistance to both AQ and SP is still low. Already in Uganda
there was high resistance of P. falciparum to SP. There was
also high probability of cross-resistance between AQ and CQ,
reducing further the eﬃcacy of AQ+SP combination. Already
one site (Tororo) showed parasitological resistance to AQ+SP
combination of 32.5%
Artesunate (3 days) + Meﬂoquine (MQ)
AS/MQ Rejected Not recommended by WHO for high transmission areas.
the NMCP. After a long discussion on ﬁnancial, logistical,
mortality reduction and other implications of the policy
change,the top MoHmanagersacceptedthe proposed policy
change in June 2004. This paved the way for the planning
for the launch and implementation of the policy change. The
new policy was oﬃcially launched by the Rt. Honourable
Prime Minister of Uganda, on behalf of His Excellency the
President of Uganda, on the 25th of April 2006 during the
commemoration of Africa Malaria Day.
2.1.2. Planning for Policy Change. At a s kf o r c ew a se s t a b -
lished by Ministry of Health to guide the planning for the
rolling out of the policy change. Four subcommittees of the
task force, commissioned in August 2004, were tasked with
development of diﬀerent aspects of the roll-out plan. The
treatment guidelines and training approaches subcommittee
updated the malaria treatment guidelines and job aids to
include the new policy details and also developed other
training materials and the training plan for health workers
and community medicine distributors; the Information,
Education, and Communication (IEC), advocacy and social
mobilization subcommittee updated the IEC materials,
developed a training module for health workers and a
handbook for parliamentarians as well as the overall com-
munication strategy to support the policy change; the supply
management subcommittee quantiﬁed the ACTs needed
annuallyusingthemorbiditymethod,proposedmechanisms
for incorporating AL into the Essential Medicines List for
Uganda and for phasing out CQ/SP and phasing in ACTs
while the monitoring and evaluation subcommittee worked
on monitoring framework for the policy roll-out, covering
process, output, and impact monitoring, incorporating AL
into the existing antimalarial medicines eﬃcacy studies as
well as establishment of pharmacovigilance and postmar-
keting surveillance. A meeting was held at central level in
September2004,wheretheproductsofthediﬀerentsubcom-
mittees were discussed, agreed upon and a team tasked to
compiletheseintoone-policyimplementationplan.Relevant
IEC and training materials were ready for mass production
for the policy implementation. Introduction of ACTs was
planned for in phased manner, starting with the health
facilities in 2005/2006 and to extend to communities for
home-based management of fever at beginning of 2007.
2.1.3. Registration of ACTs. AL (Coartem) was oﬃcially reg-
istered as an antimalarial medicine by the Uganda National
DrugAuthority(NDA)inJune2005.Itwasinitiallyclassiﬁed
as a prescription-only medicine although steps were taken
latertoreclassifyittoanover-the-countermedicinetoenable
its use at community level for the home-based management
of fever. The public-sector Coartem was in form of 4 colour-
coded packs: yellow with 6 tablets per pack for the treatment
of people with weight ranging from 5 to 14kg, blue with
12 tablets per pack, for the 15–24kg group, brown with 18
tablets per pack, for the 25–34kg group, and green with 24
tablets per pack, for the ≥35kg weight group. In Uganda,
to ease prescription, case management experts translated the
weights into matching age groups with yellow Coartem for
treatment of people from 4 months to 3 years, blue for 4
to 7 years, brown for 8 to 12 years, and green for those
above 12 years. Coartem for private-sector use was packaged
diﬀerently. Several other brands of AL besides Coartem that
were subsequently registered by the NDA include Lumartem
and Lumet Forte of CIPLA LTD. and Artefan of AJANTA6 Malaria Research and Treatment
Pharmaceuticals. Other ACTs that were also later registered
in their various brands included Artesunate + Amodiaquine,
Artesunate + SP, and Dihydroartemisinin + Piperaquine
[21]. Availability of several ACTs ensured a variety of ACTs
in the private sector. Ensuring use of high-quality ACTs
in the private sector is however still a challenge; a study
done in 2010 in 3 African countries including Uganda found
substandard ACTs on the market. In the case of Uganda, they
were only in the private sector [22].
To avoid use of artimesinin monotherapies that could
result in quick development of parasite resistance to ar-
timesinin and ACTs in general, the government (NDA)
banned importation of oral artimesinin monotherapies in
2007, although implementation may not be 100% enforced.
This resulted in signiﬁcant decline of oral artimesinin
monotherapies in the private sector.
2.2. Artimesinin Combination Therapy Introduction Process
2.2.1. Funding for ACT Introduction Process. GFATM round
4 that was the source of funding for the policy change was
signed in April 2005, and ﬁrst fund disbursement was in
December 2005. Following the disbursement from GFATM,
orders for ACTs were made by the country, through an
arrangement with WHO; WHO had an agreement with
Novartis, the manufacturer to AL (Coartem) that ensured
that countries got the drug at a very subsidized cost for
the public sector. Funds for preparatory activities including
mass production of training materials, job aides, malaria
treatment guidelines, and diﬀerent IEC materials were also
disbursed and activities initiated in January 2006. Whereas
the policy change was accepted in June 2004, it was not until
April 2006 that actual implementation started. This time lag
wasmainlyduetodelaysinGFATMgrantsigningandrelease
of funds to the country and from the government treasury to
the MoH.
2.2.2. Training. Cascade training was implemented, starting
with training of national-level trainers who trained district
trainers. Training at both levels was in form of facilitated
workshops. Samples of the prepackaged and color-coded AL
were available at these trainings for trainees to familiarize
with. The district trainers conducted on-job training of the
health workers and familiarized health workers with the
samples of the drug packs. Training was followed immedi-
ately by deployment of the medicines, to ensure that health
workers immediately initiate ACT prescription as trained,
prior to knowledge decay. The health workers in the private
sector were also trained; however private practitioners had
to procure ACTs on the open market, where it was about
10 times the cost of the public-sector ACTs. This eventually
encouraged pilferage of the public sector ACTs to some
private facilities, a practice that was actively investigated and
condemned by the government authorities.
2.2.3. Social Mobilization. A national launch of the new
treatment policy was done by the Rt. Hon. Prime Minister,
on the 25th of April 2006, on behalf of His Excellency the
President of Uganda. IEC campaign about the new and more
eﬀective antimalarial drug was conducted using radios, tele-
vision, posters, among others. Interpersonal communication
was also used in sensitization meetings with district leaders,
health workers, parliamentarians, and diﬀerent groups at
community levels. The message reached most communities
and increased the demand for the new drug by patients at the
health facilities. One of the key IEC materials for health
workers in public and private sector was a one-page chart
withthesummarizednewdrugpolicyintabularform,which
they hang in all out-patient consultation rooms and in-
patient wards for continuous reference. The campaign was
generally successful and informative.
2.2.4. Logistics Management. ACTs were procured through
WHO arrangement with Novartis for the ﬁrst 3 years of
implementation, in line with the procurement plan devel-
oped in planning phase. In quantiﬁcation and ordering for
the medicines, data from a sample of health facilities were
usedtoascertaintheproportionsofALofthediﬀerentcolors
needed. The ﬁrst shipment of AL was received on the 31st
of January 2006. Handling and distribution of ACTs were
from the onset mainstreamed into the existing government
process of clearing, storage, and distribution of medicines
by the National Medical Stores (NMS) for public sector and
Joint Medical Stores (JMS) for private not-for-proﬁt (PNFP)
sector. The NMS had to hire additional storage space to
store the AL prior to distribution as the drug was more
bulky than CQ/SP. JMS would receive from NMS supplies
for the PNFP health facilities (about 20% of the medicines)
and was in position to handle storage and distribution. The
ﬁrst distribution of AL was a “push” to all health facilities
based on morbidity estimates made at national level based
on Health Management and Information System (HMIS)
data; subsequently orders were made by the health facilities
based on estimated needs, also using the morbidity method.
As this was a new drug and health facilities were not very
clear as to the proportion of people in the diﬀerent age-
groups attending the health facility, there were overestimates
a n du n d e r e s t i m a t e so fr e q u i r e dA Lo fd i ﬀerent colors by
diﬀerent districts and health facilities. Due to this, often the
total orders received from the districts were exceeding the
procured monthly AL. Hence, some rationing was done at
the NMS to ensure that all health facilities received some
ACTs. Maintaining adequate stocks of the diﬀerent color
codes was a challenge at both national and health facility
levels. Adherence to the NMS delivery schedules was also a
challenge due to the bulkiness of the drug, the old transport
ﬂeet then, and management challenges within the insti-
tution. Delayed delivery of AL to the district and health
facilities contributed to stock-out at these levels.
2.2.5. Monitoring. To monitor the implementation of the
new malaria treatment policy, troubleshoot where problems
are being faced and ensure use of CQ/SP and monotherapies
is phased out, quarterly support supervision was planned for
in the ﬁrst year. However, the planned frequency of support
supervision was not achieved due to late release of funds andMalaria Research and Treatment 7
other competing activities that were being undertaken by
the national and district trainers. Support supervision was
hence done in samples of districts after 6 to 9 months after
the introduction of the new policy. The concept of pharma-
covigilance and the forms for reporting any adverse eﬀects
of the drug were introduced to the health workers during
the training and the reporting channel to the NDA clariﬁed.
HMIS tools were revised to capture ACTs stock-outs instead
ofCQ/SP,malariacasesanddeaths,andmalariainpregnancy
as a separate variable during the HMIS review of 2005. The
updated forms were disseminated to all districts for use in
reporting with eﬀect from 2006. HMIS data was received
monthly from all districts by the National Resource Center
at the Ministry of Health and entered in the National Data
Bank. The malaria speciﬁc information was retrieved from
the data bank and reviewed periodically by the NMCP.
2.2.6. Technical Assistance. To support the introduction of
the new policy, technical assistance was provided to the Min-
istry of Health by the WHO Country Oﬃce, the MSH, and
Malaria Consortium. In addition to technical experts within
these organizations, a full-time technical consultant attached
to the NMCP was supported by WHO to assist the
programme for 6 months in coordination of the diﬀerent
plannedactivitiesduringpolicychangeintroductionprocess.
In addition, a technical assistant was hired by MSH to
support NMS in ACT-policy-related logistics management.
All these technical experts assisted the Ministry of Health to
ensurethatallnecessarystepsasperWHOguidelinesforpol-
icy change were undertaken and also timely troubleshooting
about obstacles done.
2.3. Implementation of the New Policy
2.3.1. Review of Implementation of the New Policy. Details
of evaluation studies undertaken to assess implementation
of the new malaria treatment policy are summarized in
Table 3. Three 3 months following the introduction of the
new medicines/malaria treatment policy, as part of the
documentation of the malaria treatment policy change, a
survey was done in 5 districts (15 health facilities). The study
found that guidelines on the new policy were available in
study districts except the malaria treatment brochure which
was not available in any of the districts. Overall, in all the
5 districts, AL was prescribed for 32% of uncomplicated
malaria cases (range 5–72%), even when AL was available at
thehealthfacility.ALstock-outswerereportedasrampantin
mostofthedistricts[23].Anotherstudywasdone11months
following introduction of the new malaria treatment policy
covering 7 districts (119 health facilities), and stock-outs of
ALwereagainregistered.Thestudyfurthershowedthateven
the second-line drug, Qn, was out of stock in a signiﬁcant
numberofhealthfacilities.Seven(7)facilitieslackedbothAL
and Qn for the three months prior to the survey with a dan-
ger of health workers prescribing other ineﬀective non-ACT
antimalarials [24]. Another follow-up study done 11 months
following the malaria treatment policy change showed that
only 56% of uncomplicated malaria cases were prescribed
AL, even when the drug was available, again with signiﬁcant
stock-outs. Guidelines on malaria treatment policy change
were only available in 50% of health facilities [25]. Another
studyundertaken16monthsfollowingthemalariatreatment
policy change indicated that AL was prescribed for 64% of
uncomplicated malaria, the rest were given CQ/SP or any
other non-ACT antimalarial. In some facilities that still had
a lot of stock of CQ/SP, ACTs were being used alongside
the CQ/SP with the clinician left to make the judgment on
whom to give ACTs or CQ/SP. The tendency was for ACTs
to be prescribed for more ill-looking patients and those who
had failed to improve on CQ/SP. Stock-outs of AL were still
reported; there were still signiﬁcant amounts of CQ and SP
available on the contrary, and availability of the alternate
ﬁrst-line drug AQ/AS was very low, below 5%. Stocks of
non recommended antimalarials available on the day of the
survey were much higher than what had been reported 6
months earlier. Supervision on proper use of AL was also
noted to be weak with only 34% of health facilities reporting
having been supervised prior to the survey [26]. Malaria
wall charts, displaying the new treatment policy (1st line,
alternate ﬁrst line, 2nd line, and medicines for malaria in
pregnancy) and their dosages in tabular and pictorial form,
thatwereprovidedtohealthfacilitiestoserveasaquickguide
for health workers were only available in 48% of sampled
facilities despite having been disseminated at the time of
launching the new policy [26].
2.4. Funding Mechanisms and Their Eﬀects on Policy Imple-
mentation. In August 2005, about a year after the approval
of the new malaria treatment policy by the Ministry of
Health, 4 months after the signing of GFATM grant round
4 phase 1 agreement, and before the procurement of the ﬁrst
year’s ACTs, all GFATM grants to Uganda were suspended
following claims of mismanagement [27]. As GFATM was
the main source of funds for procurement of ACTs, imple-
mentation of the new policy had to be postponed pending
lifting of the suspension. After some negotiations, funding of
life-saving commodities like ACTs and ARVs was approved
even during the suspension, hence the procurement of the
ﬁrst year’s ACTs in 2006. Introduction of ACTs had been
planned for in a phased manner, starting with the health
facilities and to extend to communities for home-based
management of fever by early 2007. The production of the
prepacked CQ/SP for home-based management of fever,
branded Homapak, had been stopped in anticipation for
the community roll-out of ACTs at the beginning of 2007.
Due to the delays in signing the GFATM round 4 grant, its
suspension shortly after the signing, and the delays in release
ofnecessaryfunding,thecommunityroll-outwaspostponed
to 2008, yet no more Homapak was being produced. Hence,
this channel of antimalarial access (through home-based
management of fever at community level) was rendered
nonfunctional hampering the eﬀorts to increase accessibility
to ACTs within 24 hours of fever onset. The suspension
was lifted in November 2005. The procurement of the life-
saving commodities including ACTs, through WHO, during
the suspension enabled the Ministry of Health to plan for the8 Malaria Research and Treatment
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launch of the new malaria treatment policy in April 2006.
After lifting the suspension, the disbursements were still not
timely due to diﬀerent reasons, thus resulting in stock-outs.
The signing of GFATM round 4 grant phase 2 was delayed
by almost 18 months during which there was again rampant
stock-out of ACTs in the whole country.
2.5.CountryEﬀortstoAddressDrugStock-OutChallenges. To
increase local availability of ACTs and address the challenges
of stock-outs, a local manufacturing plant, Quality Chem-
icals Industries Ltd., was established through collaboration
between CIPLA and a Ugandan business group and com-
missioned in 2008. Soon after passing Good Manufacturing
Practice (GMP), the factory started producing ACTs that
were bought locally to try and ﬁll in the gaps created by
the delayed GFATM funds. However, this could not close
the big gap and the demand from the community, especially
during the 18 months of delay in signing of the GFATM
round 4 grant phase 2. Reasons for this were twofold; the
production capacity of the local ﬁrm was low given the fact
that it was in its infancy stage, and government expenditure
on medicines was low yet it was supposed to purchase
ACTs using own resources from the local ﬁrm. Per capita
expenditure on medicines was only US$ 1.7 in 2006/07 far
below an estimated requirement of US$ 7.5 [28]. Dur-
ing GFATM round 4 grant phase 2 period, Uganda was
selectedto pilot the Aﬀordable Medicines Facility for malaria
(AMFm) that would enable countries to access ACTs at a
subsidized price, even for the private sector. There was a
protracted negotiation between Government and AMFm as
this seemingly good facility could potentially interfere with
the prospects of the local manufacturing plant and country
eﬀortstoincreaselocalavailabilityofACTs.However,assoon
as a workable agreement was reached, Uganda accepted to be
a pilot country for AMFm. Aﬀordable Medicines Facility for
malariaagreementwassignedandlaunchedonApril252011
(World Malaria Day). To date some of the ﬁrst-line buyers in
the private sector have already received about 2 million ACTs
doses. This will hopefully contribute to more availability of
ACTs and pave way for the eventual removal of CQ and
SP for malaria treatment, leaving SP for only intermittent
presumptive treatment of malaria in pregnancy.
3. Discussion
The experience of changing malaria treatment policy from
CQ/SP to ACTs brings out several issues that are critical for
consideration in policy change that constitute lessons learnt
in the process. Several countries have gone through this
process, and it is well appreciated that the malaria treatment
policy change process is a complex endeavor and its success-
ful implementation is inﬂuenced by several factors [29].
4.Decision-Making
Policy change for malaria treatment must be based on evi-
dence of growing parasite resistance [29, 30]. Although it is
agreed that evidence to change policy should be of high
quality and rigorous, the nature and amount of evidence
required to change a drug policy can lead to protracted
discussions [31]. In many countries evidence from eﬃcacy
studies has been used to justify malaria treatment policy
changes [32] but it is now recognised that this alone is not
suﬃcient [33]. Others have argued that given the complex-
ities of changing drug polices the picture should be more
comprehensive; evidence on cost eﬀectiveness, cost of chang-
ing the drug policy, provider, and community acceptability
and operational feasibility should be considered alongside
eﬃcacy data [4, 33]. Indeed in Tanzania, after presentation
of results from clinical trials showing parasite resistance to
CQ,furtherresearchwascommissionedtogenerateevidence
on cost eﬀectiveness of alternative antimalarials and cost
of changing the drug policy [34]. Other favorable factors
include consistency of ﬁndings from several sites within
the country, evidence drawn from a wide range of the
study population, availability of local research with results
similar to those in other countries, and credible partners like
WHO being in agreement with presented evidence [30, 34].
In the case of Uganda, evidence presented was generated
from several studies undertaken in diﬀerent parts of the
country, representing diﬀerent levels of malaria endemicity.
Results were consistent with those from Kenya, Tanzania,
and Malawi. At around the same time, WHO released the
positiononACTsasthemosteﬀectiveantimalarials[11],and
international pressure from malaria experts about the need
for a change in drug policy to ACTs as ﬁrst-line treatment of
malaria was also ongoing [12]. These factors were favorable
to the dialogue on policy change in Uganda.
Several studies have emphasized the importance of insti-
tutionalizing malaria drug policy reviews based on systemat-
ically collected data, early and continuous engagement of all
key stakeholders in the process, and improved communica-
tion [34, 35]. In the case of Uganda, presentation of the data
to the policy makers when resistance had already surpassed
thresholds without having primed them of the growing
resistance over time resulted in conspiracy suspicion. A mul-
ticountryanalysisoftheprocessofchangingnationalmalaria
treatment policy showed that lack of standardized data,
initial lack of understanding of how to use research ﬁndings
to inﬂuence policy, and poor communication between key
stakeholders were among the challenges faced [35].
In consideration of the data on eﬃcacy of the diﬀerent
drug combinations, there is need to look at the current
eﬃcacy, the rate of deterioration of eﬃcacy recorded in the
country or in similar countries, the resistance mechanisms
and possibility of cross-resistance and project how long the
combination is likely to be of acceptable eﬃcacy in the
country if used well. If a fairly eﬃcacious combination that
has been deteriorating at a relatively fast rate is adopted, it
is likely to exceed the policy change threshold and lead to
another policy change process in a few years. This was the
case with the policy change from CQ to CQ/SP. Whereas
AQ/SP had been proposed as an option for consideration for
use in home-based management of fever, instead of taking
ACTstothecommunity,theeﬃcacyofthedrugcombination
AQ/SP had fallen signiﬁcantly within a year [8] that it was
n o tr e g r e t t a b l ei th a dn o tb e e na d o p t e da sa no p t i o n .Malaria Research and Treatment 11
What it costs to change and implement a policy has also
been a challenge to taking optimal decisions especially in
instances where the policy being adopted is more costly than
the one in use [36–38]. In Uganda, the change from CQ to
CQ/SP was partly driven by the fact that this option was
aﬀordable to the government and patients seeking care in
the private sector. Similarly in Tanzania, the change from
CQ as a ﬁrst-line drug to SP was driven by aﬀordability
despite the fact that research had shown a rising parasite
resistance trend to SP [34]. Availability of the GFATM funds
was a major inﬂuence on the adoption of the ACT treatment
policy in Uganda. Although donor aid plays a key role in
ﬁnancing health services, the extent to which developing
countries should make policy decisions based on funding
from donors continues to be hotly debated. The lack of
predictability, sustainability, and alignment has been docu-
mented in Uganda and other developing countries, hamper-
ing implementation of programmes [39–41]. Similarly this
could hamper policy implementation. In the case of Uganda,
the suspension of GFATM due to alleged mismanagement
resulted in delayed implementation of the new policy, and
the delay in signing the GFATM round 4 grant phase 2
resulted in rampant ACT stock-outs.
External inﬂuences on drug policy change can be several;
donors through availing funds can inﬂuence drug policy
change. Inﬂuence of donors in policy change processes in
developing countries, largely tied on receiving donor aid, has
been documented. In instances where this has been in con-
ﬂict with local contexts, resistance from recipient countries
hasnotalwaysbeensuccessful[42].Otherexternalinﬂuences
on policy change could be manufacturers and technical
oﬃcers-leaning towards some manufacturers. In Uganda
decision-makingprocess,therewasalotofpushforadoption
of AS/AQ versus AL, with 2 diﬀerent groups of people in the
meeting pushing for the 2 medicines, which raised suspicion
of the possibility of indirect inﬂuence by the manufacturers
of the 2 drug combinations. The eventual adoption of AL
as ﬁrst-line and AS/AQ as alternative ﬁrst-line was partly
as a form of compromise. These inﬂuences were also
documented in Tanzania where the change from CQ to SP
was decampaigned by pharmaceuticals manufacturers and
traders who had large stocks of CQ and had even made more
investments to continue with CQ production and marketing
[34]. As much as possible, manufacturers’ inﬂuence should
be avoided in the discussion on drug policy change and
focus be put on eﬃcacy, cost-eﬀectiveness, acceptability, and
feasibility of use of the diﬀerent medicines. Provider and
consumerconﬁdenceintherecommendeddrugpolicyisalso
critical for eﬀective implementation. In Tanzania, a belief by
thepublic thatCQ wasstill eﬀectivedespite resultsof eﬃcacy
studies that showed high parasite led to protracted discus-
sions and loss of time in the policy change process [34]. The
low provider and consumer acceptability of Amodiaquine
d u et ot h ep e r c e i v e ds e v e r es i d ee ﬀects was an important
factor in decision-making in Uganda. In addition, there
were also concerns about co-packaging of AS/AQ against the
background of low provider and consumer acceptability as
this could result in situations where patients consume only
Artesunate and not Amodiaquine and lack of pediatric for-
mulation for AS/AQ at the time. However, the manufacturer
has now started producing coformulated AS/AQ as well as
the pediatric formulations.
5.SocialMobilization
Involvement of the public needs to be harnessed right
from the time of undertaking the research, dissemination
of results, to launching and implementing the policy. The
public should know and understand why a new policy is
being developed. Public suspicions, personal experiences,
and lack of trust have often derailed policy change processes.
In Tanzania, parliamentarians’ public pronouncements that
they were continuing to use CQ raised questions among the
general public about the need to change the drug policy to
SP. In addition, isolated incidences from patients who had
had side eﬀects from other antimalarials further detracted
the debate [43]. Public pronouncements by high ranking
oﬃcial facilitates uptake of new polices. In Uganda, launch
of the new treatment policy by the Rt. Hon. Prime Minister
during the commemoration of Africa Malaria Day energized
the policy implementation and reinforced government’s
commitment to ﬁght malaria. In Tanzania, launch by the
honorable minister of health also greatly enhanced public
conﬁdence [34]. However, caution also needs to be taken
on what message is given and the potential eﬀects of the
message. They should be pretested well to ensure that they
communicate the intended message. In Uganda, the message
sent out that ACTs were the most eﬀective drug had far
reachbutinsomecasesresultedinsomeunperceivedactions.
Some health workers would keep this very eﬀective drug for
the patients that were very sick looking or those who did not
respondinitiallytoCQ/SP.Inthelattercase,itwasbeingused
as a second line instead of ﬁrst-line treatment.
The policy of clinical diagnosis and presumptive treat-
ment of all fever, especially in children less than 5 years,
as malaria [10], resulted in several non-malaria cases being
treated as malaria. Whereas CQ had antipyretic eﬀects and
hence patients would initially feel a bit better on CQ even
if they did not have malaria, AL lacked this quality. Hence
febrile patients, misdiagnosed and treated as malaria, would
in most cases not feel better while on AL, and this was
quite disappointing to the public given the IEC messages
passed. After some time, the public started discrediting AL,
indicating that it is not as eﬀective as had been portrayed.
However, eﬃcacy studies at the time still indicated that AL
was quite eﬃcacious. Subsequently, the Ministry of health
adopted a malaria diagnostic policy that requires each febrile
caseto be subjected to parasitological diagnosis of malaria by
microscopy or rapid diagnostic tests, and only parasitologi-
cally positive cases should be treated with antimalarials.
5.1. Cost. Treatment policy change is quite costly and should
be well planned for. Although the highest cost falls on
acquiring the drug, training, preparation of guidelines, com-
munication, supervision, and monitoring of policy imple-
mentation, continued therapeutic eﬃcacy testing of the drug
and informing the policy makers when changes are needed12 Malaria Research and Treatment
are costly activities which are often underrated. In Tanzania,
estimations showed that the cost of changing the malaria
drug policy amounted to 1% of overall public expenditure
a n d3 %o fa n n u a ld r u gb u d g e t[ 44]. Key activities are often
not undertaken compromising successful implementation of
the policy. In Uganda, support supervision was not imple-
mented as planned, and this possibly had a negative eﬀect
on the policy implementation.
Many of the malaria patients are attended to in the
private sector. Hence, malaria treatment policy should be
implemented by both the public and the private sectors. In
Uganda, whereas the private sector was trained on the new
malaria treatment policy, the subsidized medicines procured
with GFATM funds and later from the local manufacturer
were distributed to the public and private not for proﬁt
sectors only. The private-for-proﬁt facilities and pharmacies
had to procure the medicines from the open market at
a cost almost 10 times the cost of the one in the public
sector. This resulted to limited access to ACTs in the private
sector due to cost, yet, use of the private health sector in
Uganda is signiﬁcant with 59% of ﬁrst consultations taking
place in the private sector [45]. The Aﬀordable Medicines
Facility for malaria aims at providing more subsidized ACTs
to both public and private sectors and will potentially assist
toaddressthisgap.Private-publicpartnershipsshouldbeput
into consideration in designing policy changes.
6. Implementation
Changing a policy based on evidence does not automatically
guarantee its implementation. There are operational issues
which may relate to the health system in general but also
to health workers’ attitudes that need to be addressed. In
the case of Uganda, evaluation studies showed variations in
the new drug policy uptake by the health workers, ranging
from 34% to 64%. Evidence shows that reasons for this are
several; the lack adequate supplies of AL, concern about AL
costs, and the availability of non-recommended antimalar-
ials like Amodiaquine caused prescription confusion [46].
Health-system-related challenges faced in Uganda included
weak stock management and the resultant stockouts; health
workers also had diﬃculties quantifying needs for the
diﬀerent packs when making orders. Supervision was not
undertaken regularly, and diagnostic capacity was weak
even when the new guidance on parasitological diagnosis
before prescription of ACTs was issued. Available stocks of
nonrecommended antimalarials were signiﬁcant. Whereas
thismayhavebeenduetothehighlevelofstock-outsofALin
most sites, this to some extent undermined implementation
of the new policy where AL was available. Kangwana et al.
noted that the key benchmark of successful drug policy
implementation is ensuring availability of recommended
medicines at service delivery levels [47].
Although there was good progress in implementation of
the policy, more supervision needed to be done to assure
health workers of the availability of ACTs and ensure they
prescribe ACTs for all uncomplicated malaria, especially
when ACTs were available at the health facilities. The need
to review the importance of color coding was also ﬂagged as
an issue requiring further scrutiny. Improving availability of
AL, strengthening the supply chain, and diagnostic capacity
were also noted as key to successful implementation of the
new drug policy.
Among the remedial eﬀorts to counter rampant stock-
outs in Uganda was starting local manufacturing of ACTs.
Similarly, in Sudan, a year into implementation of the
drug policy change 4 local manufacturing companies had
registered their ACT products in Sudan. The extent to which
thiscanaddressACTshortagesdependsonseveralfactors.In
the case of Uganda improvements were modest given the
low production capacity of the local ﬁrm in its infancy
stage and low government expenditure on medicines; it was
supposed to purchase ACTs using own resources. Per capita
expenditure on medicines was only US$ 1.7 in 2006/07 far
below an estimated requirement of US$ 7.5 [28]. In the case
of Sudan, the cost of the drug was prohibitive to an ordinary
Sudanese given the fact that services in public facilities
were not free and, indeed, a household survey showed that
treatmentwithACTswasonly10.5%onaverageandcostwas
a major hindrance [30].
7. Conclusion andLessons Learnt
Uganda adopted ACT treatment policy for malaria in 2005
at a time when the CQ/SP combination was evidently not
the best treatment option for malaria cases in Uganda.
Policy change was facilitated by the availability of funds from
GFATM. The planning for policy change was meticulously
done;howevertheimplementationhasbeenplaguedbyram-
pant stock-outs of the ACTs. Until the ACTs are available at
the service delivery centres at health facility and community
levels, the full impact of the new policy change may not be
achieved, and the use of non-recommended antimalarials
will remain a problem. The advent of AMFm and the local
manufacturing of ACTs provide opportunities for ensuring
unlimited access to ACTs by all but factors that may hinder
realization of this objective need to be addressed.
In malaria endemic countries, drug policy change is
something to be expected at one point in time. Coun-
tries should consider institutionalizing necessary processes,
engagement of all stakeholders, constant dialogue using sys-
tematically collected data but must also agree on what kind
of data is crucial. Comprehensive cost estimates should
be computed to undertake all key activities and funding
mobilized for successful policy change processes and imple-
mentation. The private sector remains a signiﬁcant source
of health care for the population, and improving access to
new drug polices will involve strong partnerships, regulation
and addressing impediments to accessing care in the private
sector as much as feasible.
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